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ABSTRACT
The net impacts and private and social benefits and costs of workforce development
programs were estimated in four separate studies; two of them examining programs in
Washington, one in Virginia, and one in Indiana. The programs included the public job training
system, programs at community and technical colleges, adult basic education, private career
schools, high school career and technical education, and vocational rehabilitation for disabled
individuals and for blind or visually impaired individuals. This paper will focus on the progratns
offered by the public job training system (administered and funded by the Workforce Investment
Act (WIA) and its predecessor act, the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA)).
The net impact analyses were conducted using a nonexperimental methodology.
Individuals who had encountered the workforce development programs were statistically
matched to individuals who had not. Administrative data with information from the universe of
program participants and Labor Exchange data for registrants (who served as the comparison
group pool) were used for the analyses. These data included several years of pre-program and
outcome information including demographics, employment and earnings information from the
Unemployment Insurance wage record system', and transfer income infolmation such as Food
Stamps and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) recipiency and benefits.
This paper presents the results from the studies and extends them in three directions.
First, it compares and contrasts the results across the four studies. Second, two studies present a
decomposition of the net impacts into employment, wage, and hours impacts. Third, it displays
rates of return for individuals served by the programs, for state taxpayers, and for society as a
whole. In general, we find positive net impacts and retulTIS on investment for virtually all of the
programs.
The policy implications of this work are several in number. First, the studies add to the
inventory of work that demonstrates that useful evaluations of workforce development education
and training programs can be done with administrative data. Second, the decomposition of net
earnings impacts into employment, hours, and wage rates adds rich understanding to the impacts
of these programs. The rate of return analyses demonstrate that the public (i.e., taxpayers) and
society as a whole can benefit financially from public training investments, although the payoffs
generally take more than 10 quarters to offset the costs.
Finally, the results for individual programs are illuminating. The estimates presented
here suggest that the Workforce Investment Act services for adults seem to have a significant
positive impact on employment, wage rates, and earnings. Not surprisingly, the analyses point
out the large foregone earnings that are borne by dislocated workers during their training that
dampen the financial payoff to training. Policy makers may wish to consider stronger support
mechanisms for these workers such as stipends during training.

INTRODUCTION
This paper contrasts and compares the net impacts of workforce development programs
estimated in four independent studies done in three states. These estimates were computed using
a nonexperimental methodology in which individuals who had been served by the workforce
system in the state were statistically Inatched to individuals who had encountered the
Employment Service. The impetus for these studies was a commitment on the part of these
states to public accountability and data-driven performance monitoring and management.
In three of the studies from which the net impacts that are reported here emanate, rates of
return have been calculated for the workforce development programs that include a full
accounting of the 0ppoliunity costs of pmiicipants' training investments, tax liabilities incurred
due to increased emnings, as well as changes in emnings-conditioned transfers such as
unemployment compensation, TANF benefits, food stamps, and Medicaid. Furthelmore these
two studies estimate the net impacts on earnings as well as the components of emnings:
employment, hours, and wage rates.
The contributions of this paper are fourfold: 1) to compare and contrast the net impacts
on employment and earnings across the three independent studies; 2) to show the decomposition
of the net impacts into employment rates, hours, and wage rates; 3) to present rates of return to
individuals, states, and society, and 4) to point out policy implications of the work.
The next section of the paper will provide detail about the programs that were examined
in these studies, the specific outcomes for which net impact estimates were generated, and the
analysis periods. All four studies used administrative data from multiple workforce development
programs, but this paper will focus on the programs offered by the public job training system
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(administered and funded by the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) and its predecessor act, the
Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA)). The succeeding section of the paper will present the
results of the studies for those programs -- net impacts and rates ofretum. Next, we discuss
briefly how the net impact and rates of retulTI estimates compare to other studies in the literature.
The final section presents some policy implications of the work.

PROGRAMS, OUTCOMES, AND TIME PERIODS
This paper draws from four studies. Each study examined a slightly different set of
workforce development programs covering different time periods. Table 1 displays the various
programs and time periods. The first two studies, done in Washington, focused on
approximately the same programs: federal job training for adults, dislocated workers, and youth;
a state-suppolied program for dislocated workers; apprenticeships; and four types of educational
programs: adult basic education, high school career and technical education, comlnunity college
job prep, and private career schools. In the second study in Washington, rehabilitative services
programs were added to the scope of work. The programs analyzed for the study done in
Virginia overlapped these programs somewhat: they included the federal job training programs
for adults, dislocated workers, and youth; community college career and technical education;
adult education; and rehabilitative services. In addition, this study included trade adjustment
assistance, welfare-to-work, and Food Stamps Employment and Training (FSET). In Indiana, we
estimated the net impacts of the federal job training programs for adults, dislocated workers, and
youth; community college career and technical education; and trade adjustment assistance.
As noted in table 1, the time periods in which the participants were in the programs
varied across the studies. The studies defined participation year by when the individual exited
2

from the program. All of the studies used the entire universe of program exiters: in 1997/98 and
1999/00 for the first Washington study; in 2001/02 and 2003/04 for the second Washington
study; 2004/05 for the Virginia study; and 2005/06 for Indiana. To be clear, SOlneone who
participated in a program for three years and who exited sometime during 1997/98 is considered
to be a 1997/98 participant, as is someone who both entered and exited in 1997/98. 1
In all studies, the net impacts of participation in the workforce development programs on
employment and ealuings were estimated. The data came from the quarterly wage record data
generated from the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system, and thus are measured over a calendar
quarter. In Washington, the wage record data include hours worked in a qumier, so for the
studies undertaken for that state, we estimated the net impacts on hours worked per qumier and
hourly wages. Virginia had an interest in the extent to which pmiicipants earned credentials
either during program participation or within a year of exit, so that outcome was analyzed in the
Virginia study? The Indiana study focused on employment and earnings as well as post-training
unemployment compensation benefits.
The Washington studies also examined the net impact of program pmiicipation on the
receipt of unemployment compensation benefits, public assistance benefits (TANF and Food
Stamps), and Medicaid enrollment. These data were supplied by the state agencies that
administer those programs. Table 2 summarizes the outcomes that were examined in the studies.
As table 2 notes, all of the studies focused on two outcome time periods: a Sholi-tenn outcome
and a longer-term outcome. In Washington, these were three full qumiers after exit and 8-11 full
1 In the tenninology of Imbens and Angrist (1994), the estimates that we have produced are local average
treatment effects (LATE). Ifwe had used entry date to defIne participation (and matched on it rather than exit date),
then we would be estimating the average treatment effect (ATE). In general, the fonner are larger than the latter.
2The Virginia study also used the wage record data to develop an outcome variable that was used to
measure employer satisfaction.
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Table 1
Programs Analyzed and Year of Participation,a by Study
Study 1
Exit Year

Federal Job Training (Adults):
Federal Job Training (Youth):

Study 2
Exit Year

199711998

1999/2000

JTPA II-A
WIAI-B

X

X

JTPA II-C
WIAI-B

X

Study 3
Exit Year

Study 4
Exit Year

2001/2002

2003/2004

2004/2005

2005/2006

X

X

Xb

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

Xb

X

X

X

Youth
JTPA III
WIAI-B
Comm. and Tech. College Worker Retraining

Dislocated Workers:

~

X

X

X

X

X
X

Secondary Career and Tech Ed.

X

X

X

X

Community College Job Prep

X

X

X

X

X

XC

X
XC

X
XC

X
XC

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

Private Career Schools
Adult Ed.iLiteracy
Rehab. Services: Vocational Rehabilitation
Blind and Visually Impaired
Apprenticeships
Welfare-to-Work:
Trade Adjustment Assistance

X
TANF
FSET

X

X
X
X

Study 1 is Hollenbeck and Huang 2003 (Washington State); Study 2 is Hollenbeck and Huang 2006 (Washington State);
Study 3 is Hollenbeck and Huang 2008 (Virginia). Study 4 is Hollenbeck 2009 (Indiana).
aYear of participation defined as year of exit from services.
bCombined in this study.
cAdult basic education as delivered by community and technical colleges only.
NOTE:

X

Table 2
Outcomes Examined and Time Periods, by Study
Outcomes

Study 1 and Study 2

Study 3

Study 4

Employment

Defined as 2: $100 in a quarter

Defmed as 2: $50 in a quarter or
enrolled in school if:S 18

Defined as 2: $100 in a quarter; 2: $50
in a quarter (youth)

Earnings

Quarterly earnings totaled across all
employers

Quarterly earnings totaled across all
employers

Quarterly earnings totaled across all
employers

Hours Worked per Quarter

Hours totaled across all employers

Not available

Not available

Hourly wages

Earnings divided by hours worked

Not available

Not available

Credential completion

Not available

Credential earned while in program or Not available
within 12 months of exit

Unemployment compensation Benefits of at least $1 in quarter

Not available

Benefits of at least $1 in quarter

TANFlFood Stamp benefits

Benefits received by assistance unit
that included participant of at least
$1 in quarter

Not available

Not available

Medicaid eligibility

Not available
State Medicaid administrative data
indicated participant was "enrollee"
during at least one day in quarter

Not available

3 full quarters after exit
2 full quarters after exit
8-11 full quarters after exit in study 1; 4 full quarters after exit
9-12 full quarters after exit in
study 2

3 full quarters after exit
7 full quarters after exit

Time Periods:
Short term
Long term

Study 1 is Hollenbeck and Huang 2003 (Washington State); Study 2 is Hollenbeck and Huang 2006 (Washington State); Study 3 is Hollenbeck
and Huang 2008 (Virginia); Study 4 is Hollenbeck 2009 (Indiana).

NOTE:

qumiers after exit in the first study (9-12 full qualiers in the second study). In Virginia, these
were two and four full quarters after exit, respectively, and in Indiana, they were three and seven
full quarters after exit.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Net impacts. Table 3 provides a sUlnmary of the short-term net impacts of the programs
on employment rates, quarterly hours of employment, average wage rates, and quarterly average
earnings. All of the results in the table for studies 1, 2, and 4 are regression-adjusted, and all of
the outcomes,except for quarterly hours, include zero values. 3 For the study 3 results, the
employment rates are differences in means and the qumierly earnings results are differences in
Table 3
Short-Term Net Impact Estimates for WIA (or JTPA)
Outcome
Program

Employment
Rate

Quarterly
Hours

1
2
3
4

0.109***
0.097***
0.034***
0.148***

23.0**
52.2***

2
3
4

0.061 ***
0.042**
-0.039**
0.034

2
4

0.075***
0.087***
0.170***

Study

Wage
Rateb

Quatierly
Eatningsb

$0.77
$1.49***

$349***
$711***
$146***
$549***

Federal Job Training (Adults)
JTPA II-A
WIAI-B
WIAI-B
WIAI-B

a

a

a

a

Federal Job Training (Youth)
JTPA II-C
WIA I-B Youth
WIA I-B Youth
WIA I-B Youth

-15.3
4.7

-$0.47
$0.20

a

a

a

a

-$175**
$66
$62
$24

Dislocated Workers
JTPA III
WIAI-B
WIAI-B

19.6***
58.4***
a

-$0.55
$1.04***
a

$278***
$784***
$410***

Study 1 is Hollenbeck and Huang 2003 (Washington State); Study 2 is Hollenbeck and Huang 2006
(Washington State); Study 3 is Hollenbeck and Huang 2008 (Virginia); Study 4 is Hollenbeck 2009 (Indiana).
*** represents statistical significance at the 0.01 level; ** represents statistical significance at the 0.05 level; *
represents statistical significance at the 0.10 level.
a Virginia and Indiana wage record data do not include hours so no results for quarterly hours or wage rate.
b In $2005/2006.
NOTES:

3 The tables in this paper present results for the entire population. In studies 3 and 4, we have estimated the
net impacts separately by gender as well as for the whole population.
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non-zero medians between the program participants and Inatched comparison groups. The wage
rate and ealTIings impacts are in 2005$. Note that these results include all participants-those
individuals who cOlnpleted their education or training and those who left without completing.
In examining the first column of data, one can easily discelTI that most of the programs
have statistically significant positive net impacts on short-term (3 or 4 qUal1ers after exit)
employment rates. 4 The levels of the impacts are generally in the five to 15 percentage point
range. WIA seems to be generally successful at getting pal1icipants employed. The farthest right
column of results shows the net impacts on quarterly ealTIings (for individuals with earnings).
Whereas the estimates are generally positive, there is more variability in the levels and statistical
significance of the ealTIings impacts than for employment. For example, the youth program has
earnings impacts that are essentially zero, despite reasonably robust employment rate impacts.
Table 4 displays the results for longer-term outcomes. These results reflect the extent to
which the Sho11-telID impacts are retained. The results are not substantially different from those
in table 3. This suggests that for the most part, the programs' outcomes do not depreciate during
the first few years after exit. The programs result in a statistically significant positive
employment net impact, and all of them save federal job training for youth, have statistically
significant and positive earnings impacts.

4 The results for Youth are mixed. The two studies in Washington state show positive and significant
employment gain; but neither the Virginia nor Indiana studies have this result. In fact, the Virginia employment
impact for Youth is negative and significant.
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Table 4
Long-Term Net Impact Estimates ofWIA (or JTPA)
Outcome
Study

Program

Employment
Rate

Quarterly
Hours

Federal Job Training (Adults)
JTPA II-A
WIA I-B
WIAI-B

2
4

0.074***
0.066***
0.137***

23.9***
35.7***

Federal Job Training (Youth)
JTPA II-C
WIA I-B Youth
WIA I-B Youth

2
4

0.053**
0.103***
0.023

2.3
31.1***

Dislocated Workers
JTPA III
WIAI-B
WIAI-B

2
4

0.073***
0.064***
0.165***

26.6***
48.8***

b

b

b

Wage
Ratea

Qumierly
Eamingsa

$0.68**
$0.67**

$658***
$455***
$463***

b

-$0.71
$0.77***
b

-$0.10
$0.97***
b

$117
$325***
$47
$1,009***
$771***
$310***

Study 1 is Hollenbeck and Huang 2003 (Washington State); Study 2 is Hollenbeck and Huang 2006
(Washington State); Study 4 is Hollenbeck (2009).
*** represents statistical significance at the 0.01 level; ** represents statistical significance at the 0.05 level; *
represents statistical significance at the 0.10 level.
a In $2005/2006.
b Data not available.
NOTES:

Rates of return. In addition to the net impact analyses, we conducted benefit-cost
analyses for the workforce development programs in the two Washington and in the Indiana
studies. The benefits that were calculated included the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Increased lifetime emnings (discounted)
Fringe benefits associated with those emnings
Taxes on earnings (negative benefit to participants; benefit to society)
Reductions in UI benefits (negative benefit to pmiicipants; benefit to society)
Reductions in TANF benefits (negative benefit to participants; benefit to society)
Reductions in Food Stamp benefits (negative benefit to participants; benefit to
society)
Reductions in Medicaid benefits (negative benefit to participants; benefit to
society)

The costs included the following:
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•
•
•

Foregone eatIDngs (reduced eatTIings during the period of training)
Tuition payments
Program costs

Most of these costs and benefits were derived from the net impact estimates. The details about
how these costs and benefits were estimated or calculated are in the appendix.
Table 5 displays the estimated benefits and costs for the JTP A and WIA programs
analyzed in the two Washington studies and for WIA in the Indiana study for the first 10 quatiers
after program exit and for the average working lifetime. The table entries represent financial
gains (positive benefits or negative costs) or costs (negative benefits or positive costs) for the
average participant. The costs and benefits are shown from three perspectives: for the
individual, for the public (taxpayers), and for society as a whole. The latter is the sum of the first
two. The dollar figures are in constant $2005/2006 and have been discounted at 3 percent.
The top panel shows that the discounted (net) benefits to the patiicipants over the first 10
quarters after exit are generally in the range of $3,500 to $5,000. The costs to participants are
fairly negligible for the Adults and Youth programs, but they are quite large (in the form of
foregone earnings) for dislocated workers. Concomitantly, the short-tenn retutTIS on investment
for disadvantaged adult and youth participants in this time period are quite substantial-they are
either positive or incalculable because the costs were non-positive;5 whereas the return for
dislocated workers is negative in all of the studies.
For the public, benefits are generally in the $2,000 to $6,000 range and are typically less
than the public costs of providing services. For almost none of the programs is the rate of return

5 The exception to this is JTPA II-C (Youth). The net impact estimate of loss ofTANF benefits is quite
large for this population in Study 1, and this result "drives" the negative benefits
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Table 5
Discounted Benefits and Costs and Rates of Return for Federal Job Training Programs
over First 2.5 Years after Exit, by Program
Private
Public
Program
Study Benefits
Costs
r.o.i.
Benefits
r.o.i.
Costs
Benefits
PANEL A: Over first 2.5 years after Exit
Federal Job Training (Adults)
JTPA II-A
WIAI-B
WIAI-B
Federal Job Training (Youth)
JTPA II-C
WIA I-B Youth
WIA I-B Youth
Dislocated Workers
JTPA III
WIAI-B
WIAI-B

1
2
4

$1,106
4,173
2,804

$ 403
-1,111
1,350

1
2
4

-3,646
3,313
671

384
0
495

1
2
4

4,944
4,258
1,993

13,640
10,746
6,440

8.24%

Social
Costs

r.o.i.

$3,989
3,113
2,916

$3,791
5,744
4,132

1.36%
-15.36%
-10.29%

$5,095
7,286
5,720

$4,194
4,633
5,482

3.07%
9.94%
0.85%

1,864
-1,151
6.03%
113

2,605
6,617
6,550

-4.69%

-1,782
2,163
784

2,989
6,617
7,045

-15.96%
-27.96%

882
5,770
2,376

2,885
7,081
6,426

-12.29%
-5.59%
-21.31%

5,826
10,028
4,369

16,525
17,827
12,866

-12.45%
-9.38%
-17.83%

$25,092
6,241
4,084

$3,791
5,744
4,132

9.26%
0.21%
-0.04%

$87,836
45,170
19,909

$4,194
4,633
5,482

13.23%
15.14%
7.60%

2,605
6,617
6,550

6.08%
0.07%
-1.73%

37,005
37,284
8,239

2,989
6,617
7,045

3.61%
4.55%
0.22%

2,885
7,081
6,426

6.81%
5.15%
1.50%

107,046
67,641
25,708

16,525
17,827
12,866

5.53%
5.04%
2.13%

10.54%

-12.49%
-10.72%
-15.76%

PANEL B: Over working lifetime
Federal Job Training (Adults)
JTPA II-A
WIAI-B
WIAI-B

1
2
4

$62,744
38,928
15,825

$ 403
-1,111
1,350

20.52%

Federal Job Training (Youth)
JTPA II-C
WIA I-B Youth
WIA I-B Youth

30,235
29,002
7,055

384
0
495

3.08%

2
4

13.27%

6,770
8,282
1,184

Dislocated Workers
JTPA III
WIAI-B
WIAI-B

1
2
4

81,327
49,201
15,398

13,640
10,746
5,440

5.19%
5.00%
2.64%

25,719
18,440
10,310

16.32%

Study 1 is Hollenbeck and Huang 2003 (Washington State); Study 2 is Hollenbeck and Huang 2006 (Washington State); Study 4 is Hollenbeck 2009
(Indiana). Table entries are for average participant. Benefits include earnings, fringe benefits, and income-related transfers payments. Costs include tuition and
fees (if any), foregone earnings, and public program costs per participant. $ figures are in real $2005/2006. - means that r.o.i. could not be calculated because
of 0 or negative benefits or costs ..

NOTES:

for the public positive in the first 10 qumiers. This suggests that these programs do not fully
payoff within the first 10 quarters after a pmiicipant exits.
Taxes and income-conditioned transfers are transfers between pmiicipants and the public,
so they offset each other in the calculation of benefits and costs to society as a whole. Thus the
benefits to society in the cost-benefit analysis are simply the emuings and fringe benefits of
pmiicipants, and the costs are the participants' foregone earnings and the financial cost of
providing the program services. In the first ten qumiers, the societal benefits exceed the costs for
the WIA Adult program, but not for Youth or dislocated workers.
The lower panel of the table displays estimated benefits, costs, and retulu on investments
of the average individual served by a program through their working lifetime. Here we
extrapolated benefits from the average age of exiters until age 65. For individuals, the
discounted (net) lifetime benefits tend to be substantial, especially in the two Washington State
studies. The costs (identical to the costs given in table 5) are much less than these benefits, so
the participants' returns on investment range from about 2.5% (qumierly) to over 20%
(qumierly). 6 The benefits accruing to the public over the average worker's lifetime are
dominated by tax payments on increased emuings. Given that those earnings tend to be quite
substantial, it is not surprising that the public benefits tend to exceed the public costs, and there
tend to be positive returns to the public for the programs. For society, the story is quite similar.
The benefits far exceed the costs, and the returns are therefore quite handsome.
Validity. The net impacts and rates ofretulu presented here are, in general, quite
substantial. Are they believable? Does participation in the Workforce Investment Act endow

6

Again, two of the returns are not calculable because costs are negative or zero.
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clients with these sOlis of returns? One question that might be raised is the extent to which the
methodological approach is responsible for the positive findings. While it is generally agreed
that a random assignment approach is methodologically superior to the lnatching estimators used
in the above mentioned studies, it should be noted that the National JTPA Study (NJS) that used
a random assignment process resulted in a 13 percent earnings impact for adult men and a 15
percent earnings impact for adult women according to the U.S. General Accounting Office
(1996). The comparable estilnate in table 4--an emnings impact of $658 (2005/2006 $) is about a
22 percent impact (lnean quarterly earnings are $2,946 for this group.) The Washington State
results reported here are larger than the NJS, but both studies imply quite large returns.
Another issue that might be raised is that the author of this paper is also an author of all
of the WIA impact studies cited above. The U.S. Depmiment of Labor funded a quasiexperimental evaluation of WIA whose results are reported in Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske
(2008). For the WIA adult program, these authors report a significant qumierly emnings impact
of about $600 for women and $450 for men (2005: 1 $). The comparable result repolied in table
4 is about $450 for the total population. For the WIA dislocated worker program, these authors
report a significant qumierly ealnings impact of about $380 for women and $220 for men7. The
comparable results repolied in table 4 are $771 in Washington State and $310 in Indiana for the
total population. Note that Mueser, Troske, and Gorislavsky (2007) use several quasiexperimental approaches to estimate the impact of JTP A in the state of Missouri, and their
prefelTed specification results in an earnings impact of about 14 percent for men and 23 percent
for women. All in all, it seems like the estimates presented here "fit" within the literature.
7 Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske (2008) indicate that a difference-in-difference estimate for dislocated
workers attenuates these inlpacts toward zero.
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CONCLUSIONS
The contribution of this paper has been to extend in two directions the net impact
estimates that have been generated through nonexperimental methods with administrative data.
In two studies, the net earnings impacts were decomposed into employment, hours of work, and
wage rate impacts. Secondly, the earnings impacts were combined with estimates of impacts on
fringe benefits, tax payments, and income-conditioned transfers to conduct a benefit cost analysis
of workforce programs.
The policy implications of this work are several in number. First, the studies add to the
inventory of work that demonstrates that useful evaluations of the federal job training programs
can be done with administrative data. Second, the decomposition of net emnings ilnpacts into
employment, hours, and wage rates adds rich understanding to the variation in these impacts
across programs. The rate of return analyses demonstrate that the public (i.e., taxpayers) and
society as a whole can benefit financially from education and training investments, although the
payoffs generally take more than 10 quarters to offset the costs.
Finally, the results for individual programs are illuminating. The Workforce Investment
Act (WIA) services for adults seem to have a significant positive impact on employment, wage
rates, and earnings. However, the analyses point out the large foregone emnings of dislocated
workers that dampen their financial payoff to training. Policy makers may wish to consider
stronger support mechanisms for these workers such as stipends during training.
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APPENDIX
METHODOLOGY FOR NET IMPACT ESTIMATION
AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES
The net impact evaluation problem may be stated as follows: Individual i, who has
characteristics Xu, at time t, will be observed to have outcome(s) Yit( 1) if he or she receives a
"treatment," such as pmiicipating in the workforce development system and will be observed to
have outcome(s) Yit(O) ifhe or she doesn't pmiicipate. The net impact of the treatment for
individual i is Yit(1) - Yit(O). But of course, this difference is never observed because an
individual cannot simultaneously receive and not receive the treatment.
The time subscript is dropped in the following discussion to simplify the notation without
loss of generality. Let Wi = 1 if individual i receives the treatment, and Wi = 0 if i does not
receive the treatment. Let T represent the data set with observations about individuals who
receive the treatment for whom we have data, and let nT represent the number of individuals with
data in T. Let U represent the data set with observations about individuals who may be similar to
individuals who received the treatment for whom we have data, and let nu be its sample size. Let
C be a subset of U that contains observations that "match" those in T, and let nc be its sample
size. Names that may be used for these three data sets are Treatment sample (T), Comparison
sample universe (U), and Matched Comparison sample (C).
Receiving the treatment is assumed to be a random event-individuals happened to be in
the right place at the right time to learn about the program, or the individuals may have
experienced randomly the eligibility criteria for the program-so Wt is a stochastic outcome that
can be represented as follows:
(1)

Wt = g(Xt, ei),
where
ei is a random variable that includes unobserved or unobservable characteristics
about individual i as well as a purely random component.

An assumption made about g( e) is that 0 < prob(Wt = 1!Xi) < 1. This is refened to as the
"support" or "overlap" condition, and is necessary so that the outcome functions described below
are defined for all X 8
In general, outcomes are also assumed to be stochastically generated. As individuals in
the treatment group encounter the treatment, they gain celiain skills and knowledge and
encounter celiain networks of individuals. Outcomes are assumed to be generated by the
following mapping:
(2)

8

Yi(1)

=

./i(Xt) + eli

Note that hnbens (2004) shows that this condition can be slightly weakened to Pre ~ = 1!Xi) < 1.
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Individuals not in the treatment group progress through time and also achieve celiain outcomes
according to another stochastic process, as follows:
(3)

li(O) =fo(X;) + eOt

Letfk(X;) = E(Yt(k)!Xi), so ekt are deviations from expected values that reflect unobserved or
unobservable characteristics, for k = 0,1.
As mentioned, the problem is that Yi(l) and Yi(O) are never observed simultaneously.
What is observed is the following:

The expected value for the net impact of the treatment on the sample of individuals treated:
(5)

E[li(l) - YlO)~ Wi = 1] = E (~YI X, W= 1)
= E[Y(l)~ W = 1] - E[Y(O)~ W = 0] + E[Y(O)~ W = 0] "
= h" (A') - fo(A')
+ BIAS,
where

E[Y(O)~

W = 1]

"

h(A'), k= 1, 0, are the outcome lneans for the treatment and comparison group
samples, respectively, and
BIAS represents the expected difference in the YeO) outcome between the
comparison group (actually observed) and the treatlnent group (the
counterfactual. )
The BIAS term may be called selection bias.
A key assumption that allows estinlation of equation (5) is that YeO) 1. WlX This
orthogonality assumption states that given X, the outcome (absent the treatment), YeO), is random
whether or not the individual is a participant. This is equivalent to the assumption that
participation in the treatment can be explained by X up to a random error telID. The assumption
is called "unconfoundedness," "conditional independence," or "selection on observables." If the
assumption holds, then the net impact is identified because BIAS goes to 0, or
(6)

E[~

rvr, W= 1] =

~ (A') - fo(A')

In random assignment, the X and Ware uncorrelated through experimental control, so the
conditional independence assumption holds by design. In any other design, the conditional
independence is an empirical question. Whether or not the data come from a random assignment
experiment, however, because the olihogonality assumption holds only asymptotically (or for
very large samples), in practice, it lnakes sense to regression-adjust equation (6).
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Various estimation techniques have been suggested in the literature, but they may be
boiled down to two possibilities: 1) use all of the U set or 2) try to find observations in Uthat
closely match observations in T. Note that identification of the treatment effect requires that none
of the covariates X in the data sets are perfectly conelated with being in T or U. That is, given
any observation~, the probability of being in T or in U is between 0 and 1. Techniques that use
all of U are called full sample techniques. 9 Techniques that try to find matching observations
will be called matching techniques. The studies repolied here used the latter, although
Hollenbeck (2004) tests the robustness of net impact estimates to a number of matching
techniques.
The studies that are discussed here use a nearest-neighbor algorithm using propensity
scores as the distance metric (see Dehejia and Wahba 1995). Treatment observations are
matched to observations in the comparison sample universe with the closest propensity scores.
The matching is done with replacement and on a one-to-one basis. Matching with replacement
reduces the "distance" between the treatment and comparison group cases, but it may result in the
use of multiple repetitions of observations, which may aliificially dampen the standard enol' of
the net impact estimator. Finally, a caliper is employed to ensure that the distance between the
observations that are paired be less than some criterion distance.
For most of the programs analyzed (and identified in table 1), we used the public labor
exchange data (known as Job Service, Employment Service, or Wagner-Peyser data) as the
Matched Sample universe (i.e., set U). This is tantamount to the assumption that were these
workforce development programs unavailable, then the individuals who were served would have
gone to the public labor exchange for services lO •
The net impacts for the outcomes listed in tables were estimated by regression-adjusting
levels or difference-in-differences. We generally relied on the difference-in-difference estimators
except where stark changes in labor market experiences were likely to have occuned-for youth
and for dislocated workers. The base period for difference-in-difference estimators was for
qUaliers -6 to -3 before program registration. The timeline in Figure 1 is intended to help
explain the analyses periods. The timeline shows the registration and exit dates for a
hypothetical individual of adult age who registered for WIA Title I-B in April 2000 (Qualier 2 of
2000) and exited from services in November, 2001 (Qualier 4 of2001). The earnings profile
shows that this person had average qUalierly earnings of $2,500 (real) in the base period
(1998:Q4 to 1999:Q3), $2,700 in the 3rd qualier after exit (2002:Q3); and $3,100 average
qUalierly ealnings in the 9th-12th post-exit qualiers, which were 2004:Q1 to 2004:Q4. SO in the
9 Some of these techniques trim or delete a few outlier observations from Ubut will still be referred to as
full sample techniques.
10 For some of the programs other than the public job training programs focused on here, the public labor
exchange was not an appropriate counterfactual and alternative administrative data sources were used. These
programs included secondary career and technical education, vocational rehabilitation, and blind and visually
impaired services. For high school career and teclmical education, the matched comparison universe was all high
school graduates in the state. For the other two programs, the matched comparison universe was composed of nonserved applicants.
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regression adjustlnent of earnings levels, the dependent variables would have been $2,700 and
$3,100 for the short-te1m and longer-term outcomes. In the regression adjustment of differencein-differences, the dependent variables would have been $200 and $600, respectively.
Figure 1 Timeline and Earnings Profile for a Hypothetical WIA Title I-B Adult Client
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Cost-Benefit Analyses ll
Earnings. Benefits and costs are projected for the "average" pmiicipant. Figure 2 shows
the earnings profiles for the average individual in the treatment group and in the comparison
group. The hypothesis used to construct these profiles is that encountering a workforce
development program enhances an individual's skills and productivity (thus increasing wage
rates) and increases the likelihood of employment. Thus, after the training period, the treatment
earnings profile is above the comparison earnings profile (both hourly wage and employment net
impacts are positive.) During the training period, the treatment emnings will be below the
comparison earnings, on average. These are the foregone costs of training in the fOlm of wages
that are given up by the participant while he or she is receiving training.

II This discussion will present general methodological issues. Readers can find the specific parameters or
estimates that were used in the source reports.
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Figure 2. Age-Earnings Profiles of Training Participants and Comparison Group
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Training period
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The theoretical lifetime emuings benefit is the shaded area in the graph. The average
comparison group member's real earnings grow at some fairly constant rate (increase in
productivity), and the average treatment group member's emuings eventually become higher after
training and likely grow faster as they accumulate additional human capital in the form of work
experience.
The problem that needs to be solved in estimating the benefits is how to compute the
shaded area. In general, we have several qumiers of outcome data, so we can get accurate
estimates of the area up to line denoted D12 (treatment minus comparison difference at the 12th
qualier.) Because the profiles represent the average individual, we use the unconditional net
earnings impacts to calculate these benefits. (They automatically control for employment, hourly
wage, and hours worked impacts.)
What is unknown (and unknowable) is the shape of the earnings profiles into the future
after the D 12 point. The profiles could continue to move apmi from each other if the training
paliicipants continue to be more and more productive relative to the comparison group member,
or the profiles eventually may converge over time if the training effect depreciates. Alternatively,
the profiles may become parallel to reflect a scenario in which the training participants gain a
permanent advantage, but then their productivity growth eventually matches the comparison
group members. The typical approach is to extrapolate earnings into the future based on the
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observed time trend in the first 12 quarters after exit. Since the earnings benefits are received by
the participants in future periods, they need to be discounted. The studies reported here used a 3
percent real discount rate.

Fringe benefits. With additional earnings, workers will also accrue additional fringe
benefits in the form of paid leave, paid insurances, retirement/savings plan contributions, and
other non-cash benefits. Two sources of data provided estimates of the ratio of fringe benefits
(defined as paid leave plus paid insurances plus retirement plan contributions plus other) to gross
wages and salaries (including supplemental pay such as oveliime). The U.S. Depmiment of
Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics (2002), reports this ratio to be 23.3 percent for "All U.S." and
20.4 percent for the "West Census Region." The U.S. Chamber of Commerce (2001) reports a
ratio of 24.3 percent for the Pacific region. Under the assumption that workforce development
program pmiicipants are less likely to get fringe benefit coverage than the average worker, and to
be conservative in our benefit estimation, we used the assumption that this ratio would be 20
percent (applied to the discounted annual emnings increments).
Tax payments. Higher earnings will lead to payment of increased payroll, sales/excise,
local, state, and federal income taxes. 12 The increased taxes are a cost to participants and a
benefit to the public. We used average (marginal) tax rates for each of the taxes and applied these
rates to the annual earnings changes. For example, we used the cunent rate of7.65 percent to
estimate the future payroll tax liabilities. We relied on IRS data for the federal income tax rates
that factor in earned income tax credits, and state sources provided average rates for the other
types of taxes.
Unemployment compensation. Unemployment compensation benefits in the future may
increase for participants if programs increase employment (and therefore the probability of
receiving UI) or increase earnings (and therefore benefits) or they may decrease if programs
decrease the likelihood of unemployment or decrease duration of unemployment spells. Increased
UI benefits in the future would be a discounted benefit to participants and cost to the public. We
used a similar empirical strategy as we did for lifetime earnings to interpolate and extrapolate
these benefits. In pmiicular, we estimated the unconditional UI benefit net impacts for the first
12 qumiers after exit and used these estimates as the average impact for the program in those
quarters. Then we used the estimate for the 12th quarter after exit to extrapolate for 28 more
qumiers (68 quarters for WIA Youth.) In other words, we assumed that the UI benefit gain or
loss would dampen to 0 after 10 years for the Adult and Dislocated Worker programs and after
20 years for the youth program.
Income-conditioned transfers. The maintained hypothesis was that participation in the
workforce development programs would decrease the probability of receiving TANF and Food
Stamps, and the probability of enrolling in Medicaid. In addition, increased earnings may have
resulted in reductions in benefit levels for TANF and Food Stamps. Finally, if individuals no

12

Washington does not have local or state income taxes.
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longer receive TANF or Food Stamps, they would not receive any suppoli services such as child
care or other referrals
For TANF/Food Stalnps, we followed the Salne empirical strategy as we did for
unemployment compensation. We estimated net impacts for unconditional TANF benefits and
Food Stamp benefits for the twelve qualiers after program exit cohort and extrapolated beyond
that period using the estilnate from qualier +12. We again assumed that on average, the program
paliicipants may receive these benefits (or lose these benefits) for up to 40 qUaliers (or 80
qUaliers for the youth prograln) even though TANF is time limited to 20 qualiers. The reason for
going beyond 20 quarters is that these are averages for the entire program group, and the
dynalnics of recipiency will be assumed to continue for up to 10 years.
The typical pattern for the workforce development programs is that in the ShOli term,
TANF benefits are decreased for paliicipants who exit because, for the most pali, employment
rates increase-at least, some individuals leave the rolls. However, as time progresses, some
workers begin to lose employment, or become single and have dependent children, and the
group's TANF net impact benefits become positive, although of relatively small magnitude.
We followed a similar empirical strategy for Food Stamps as we did for TANF . We
estimated net impacts for unconditional benefits for the twelve qUaliers after program exit and
extrapolated beyond that period using the estimate from qUalier +12. We again assumed that on
average, the program paliicipants may receive these benefits (or lose these benefits) for up to 40
qUaliers (or 80 quarters for the youth program).
The states did not make actual benefit/usage information for Medicaid available, so we
estimated net impacts of actually being em"olled in Medicaid. Our hypothesis was that training
paliicipants will tend to decrease their enrollment rates as they become better attached to the
labor force over time and will thus lose eligibility. We convelied Medicaid em"ollment into
financial terms by multiplying the average state share of Medicaid expenditures per qUalier times
the average number of household members per case. As with TANF and Food Stamps, this is a
benefit to the paliicipant and a cost to the public. To interpolate/extrapolate the net impact of a
program on Medicaid eligibility, we either averaged or fit a linear equation tilne series of
estimated em"ollment net impacts.
Costs. Two types of costs were estimated for each of the programs. The first was
foregone earnings, which would be reduced earnings while the paliicipants were actually
engaged in the training programs. The second type of cost was the actual direct costs of the
training.
Foregone earnings represent the difference between what workforce development
program paliicipants would have earned if they had not paliicipated in a program (which is
unobservable) and what they earned while they did paliicipate. The natural estimate for the
former is the ealuings of the matched comparison group members during the length of training.
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Specifically, we used (7) to estimate mechanistically the foregone earnings. Note that we did not
discount foregone earnings, but did calculate them in real $.

(7)
where,

Foregone i

E_I' Eo

= [ 0.5 X(i-I; + E_I; )- Eo; ] Xd i
avg. quarterly earnings (uncond.) for treatment group in quarter-1
and during training period, respectively.
avg. qUalierly earnings in 1st post-exit period for matched

d

companson group
avg. training duration
indexes program

For the Inost part, the costs of providing services were supplied to us by the states. Staff
members of the state agencies calculated these costs from administrative data on days in the
program and daily cost information.
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